Kachina Choate, Plaintiff/ Appellant, v. Ars-Fresno, LLC, a California Company, Defendant/ Appellee. by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) 
2016 
Kachina Choate, Plaintiff/ Appellant, v. Ars-Fresno, LLC, a 
California Company, Defendant/ Appellee. 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellee, Choate v Ars Fresno, No. 20151054 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2016). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3162 
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with 
questions or feedback. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KACHINA CHOATE, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
V. 
ARS-FRESNO, LLC, a California 
company, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Appellate Case 20151054-CA 
District Court Case 130907594 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
ARS-FRESNO, LLC 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE PAIGE PETERSON 
Levi H. Cazier 
Beehive Law 
P.O. Box 84118 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Telephone: (801) 856-1773 
Attorneys for PlaintijJIAppellant 
nl6390. l 
J. Angus Edwards (USB #4563) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
McDONOUGH PC 
Attorneys for ARS-FRESNO, LLC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Attorneys for Defendant /Appellee 
f\Ll:.0 coURTS 
UTA\-\ APPELLATE 
JUL 11 20\6 
@ IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KACHINA CHOATE, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
V. 
ARS-FRESNO, LLC, a California 
company, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Appellate Case 20151054-CA 
District Court Case 130907594 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
ARS-FRESNO, LLC 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE PAIGE PETERSON 
Levi H. Cazier 
Beehive Law 
P.O. Box 84118 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Telephone: (801) 856-1773 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
1236390.l 
J. Angus Edwards (USB #4563) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
McDONOUGH PC 
Attorneys for ARS-FRESNO, LLC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Attorneys for Defendant I Appellee 
1236390.J 
LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties to this appeal are: 
Plaintiff/ Appellant Kachina Choate ("K. Choate"). 
Defendant/ Appellee ARS-Fresno, LLC ("ARS-Fresno"). 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .......................................................................... l 
STATEMENT OF ISSl..JES ....................................................................................... 1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW ......................................................... .3 
~ STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 6 
SUMMMA.RY OF ARGUMENTS ......................................................................... 17 
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 18 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, BECAUSE THE JURY 
FOUND THAT ARS-FRESNO'S TESTIMONY WAS 
MORE CREDIBLE THANK. CHOATE'S TESTIMONY ............... 18 
IL THE JURY FOUND THAT K. CHOATE WAS 60% 
COMPARATIVELY AT FAULT, SINCE SHE SHOULD 
HA VE BEEN MORE CAREFUL IN WINTER WEATHER 
CONDITIONS ..................................................................................... 23 
III. THE JURY VERDICT FINDING THAT K. CHOATE 
WAS 60% NEGLIGENT AND ARS-FRESNO WAS 40% 
NEGLIGENT WAS OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE .......................................................................... 27 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 30 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(±)(1) .................................. 31 
~ 1236390.1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Federal Cases 
Bridzette Lane v. D. C., l 04 F. Supp. 3d 7 (D.D.C. 2015) ................................ 19 
Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F .2d 350 (2d Cir. 1992) .................................. 19 
State Cases 
Avalos v. TL Custom, LLC, 2014 UT App 156, 330 P .3d 727 ...................... 2, 18 
Bonnivier v. Valley Asphalt, Inc., 2000 UT App 117 .................................... 1, 25 
Dejavue, Inc. v. US. Energy C01p., 1999 UT App 355 ...................................... 1 
Harris v. Utah Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983) .................................. 24 
Holmes v. Nelson, 326 P .2d 722 (Utah 1958) .................................................... 24 
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982) .............................................. 24, 26 
Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products, Inc., 939 P.2d 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ..... 24 
Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226, 311 P .3d 564 ...... 22, 23 
Selvage v. JJ Johnson Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ......... 3, 27 
Sha,p v. Williams, 915 P.2d 495 (Utah 1996) ......................................... 2, 23, 24 
Stevensen 3rd East, LC v. Watts, 2009 UT App 137, 210 P.3d 977 .................. 28 
Wilhelm v. City of Great Falls, 685 P.2d 350 (Mont. 1984) ............................. 25 
State Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 .............................................................................. 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-818 ............................................................................ 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-818(2) ......................................................................... 3 
State Rules 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a) ............................................................................................ 4 
11 
1236390.1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to§ 78A-4-103, Utah Code 
Ann. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue No. 1: ARS Fresno's liability defenses were that sufficient ice 
melt was present on the walkway in front of ARS-Fresno's store prior to K. 
Choate's slip-and-fall accident in below-freezing temperatures on December 28, 
2012 (the "Accident"), that the roof did not leak, and that water dripped off the 
roof only in above-freezing conditions. K. Choate and her mother disagreed 
that sufficient ice melt was on the walkway at the time of the Accident and her 
expert claimed there was a roof leak that did not depend on temperatures. Thus, 
as the trial court ruled in denying K. Choate's motion for new trial, an issue 
decided by the jury was the comparative credibility of the parties and their 
experts. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a motion for new trial is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Bonnivier v. Valley Asphalt, Inc., 2000 UT 
App 117 ( citing Dejavue, Inc. v. US. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355). Under 
the abuse of discretion standard, the verdict should be reversed "only if the 
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and 
1 
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unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." Sharp v. 
Williams, 915 P.2d 495, 497-499 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in K. Choate's Motion for New 
Trial filed on July 15, 2015. 
Issue No 2: ARS-Fresno's causation defense was that K. Choate should 
have been more careful walking in winter weather conditions at the time of the 
Accident. Six of the eight jurors decided that K. Choate was 60% 
comparatively at fault. Thus, the primary causation issue decided by the jury 
was that K. Choate should have been more careful. 
Standard of Review: To challenge a jury verdict, K. Choate "must carry 
the heavy burden of establishing that the evidence so clearly preponderates in 
[her] favor ... that reasonable people would not differ on concluding that [ ARS- ® 
Fresno] was negligent." Avalos v. TL Custom,, LLC, 2014 UT App 156, ,I 29, 
330 P.3d 727 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted and alterations 
added). "[S]o long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support the 
jury's findings, we will not disturb them." Id. (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in K. Choate's Motion for New 
Trial. 
2 
1236390.1 
Issue No. 3: The jury verdict finding that K. Choate was 60% 
comparatively negligent was overwhelmingly supported by the evidence. The 
evidence supporting the verdict included trial testimony by ARS-Fresno 
employees present before, and shortly after, the Accident and also by K. 
Choate' s and Bernadine Choate' s ("B. Choate") testimony. 
Standard of Review: To review a jury's verdict places a difficult 
burden on the challenging party. Selvage v. J.J. Johnson Assocs., 910 P.2d 
1252, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The appellant must show that the verdict is 
against the clear weight of the evidence by marshalling all of the evidence 
supporting the verdict and demonstrating that when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the verdict there is insufficient evidence to support it. Id. 
"Furthennore, all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the verdict, and if 
the evidence supports the verdict, we will affirm." Id. ( citation omitted). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in K. Choate's Motion for New 
Trial. 
1236390.1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Section 78B-5-818(2), Utah Code Ann., provides as follows: 
A person seeking recovery may recover from any 
defendant or group of defendants whose fault, 
combined with the fault of persons immune from suit 
and nonpaities to whom fault is allocated, exceeds the 
fault of the person seeking recovery prior to any 
3 
reallocation of fault made under Subsection 78B-5-
819(2). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Except as limited by Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to any party on any issue for any of the 
following reasons: (a) (6) insufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the verdict or other decision .... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, and disposition in the lower 
court. 
K. Choate filed her negligence action against ARS-Fresno for injuries 
allegedly sustained in the Accident at a store owned and operated ARS-Fresno 
in Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Store"). The Accident happened on a walkway 
directly in front of the Store that runs along its entire east side ( the "Walkway"). (j 
On the afternoon of the Accident, K. Choate and B. Choate parked at the 
Smith's grocery store and walked on public sidewalks to shop at several stores 
before entering the Store premises. Prior to the Accident, there had been three-
days of snow, with continuous below-freezing temperatures, and there had not 
been any petiods of sunny weather. 
K. Choate and B. Choate saw the winter weather conditions before the 
Accident, since the roads were wet, snow was piled on the sides of the roads, 
and walking near the Store they encountered a public sidewalk with a pile of 
4 
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snow on the ground that was frozen. Indeed, before the Accident, K. Choate 
and B. Choate saw that the entire Walkway was wet. However, despite 
knowledge that it may be below freezing and that the sidewalks, Walkway, and 
roads were all wet, K. Choate was not wearing winter shoes. In fact, B. Choate 
admitted that, before the Accident, she did not remember them being extremely 
careful in the way they walked. 
At the time of the Accident, the ARS-Fresno employee working in the 
Store was Stefan Jennings ("Jennings"). Jennings was 90% sure that he applied 
ice melt on the Walkway before the Accident. After the Accident was reported, 
Jennings called the manager of another ARS-Fresno store, Ray Duncan 
("Duncan"), to ask for assistance with the Accident. Duncan arrived a short 
time after the Accident, but after K. Choate and B. Choate had already left the 
Store. When Duncan arrived, there was adequate ice melt on the Walkway. 
Jennings was busy with customers and did not have time to apply ice melt 
between the time the Accident was reported and when Duncan arrived. By 
contrast, K. Choate and B. Choate testified that there was no ice melt on the 
Walkway. 
The jury trial was on June 16, 17, 18, and 19, 2015. (R. 625-626 and 
650-657). The jury answered Question Nos. 1 to 4 in the Special Verdict that 
ARS-Fresno and K. Choate were both at fault and their fault had caused harm. 
5 
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(R. 660-661). In Question No. 5 of the Special Verdict, the jury found, 
assuming that all of the fault which caused harm to K. Choate was 100%, that 
ARS-Fresno's fault was 40% and K. Choate's was 60%. (R. 662). On 
November 4, 2015, the trial court denied K. Choate's motion for new trial. (R. 
789-806; Addendum). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. ARS-Fresno owned and operated the Store at 680 East 400 South, @ 
Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 1007). 
2. Brian Blank ("Blank") was the manager of the Store from July 
2011 to February 2013. (R. 1005 and 1008). 
3. At the time of the Accident, Blank was the supervisor of the 
Store's Lead Cashier, Jennings, and other Cashiers employed at the Store, 
including David Marshall and Emily Larsen. (R. 1005, 1010 and 1013 ). 
4. In 1982, Duncan started atARS-Fresno's predecessor, Rainbow, 
and his employment at ARS-Fresno started when it purchased stores in 
December 2008. (R. 965). Duncan trained Blank when Blank was hired by 
ARS-Fresno. (R. 970). 
5. At the time of the Accident, Duncan was the manager of an ARS-
Fresno store at 2280 South Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 966-967). 
6 
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6. Blank was on vacation on the day of the Accident. (R. 994-995 
and 1020-1021). Blank's immediate supervisor was Tonya Howard, a District 
Manager. (R. 1009). 
7. Ms. Howard was on vacation on the day of the Accident. (R. 977 
and 994-995). While Ms. Howard was on vacation during December 2012 she 
assigned Duncan to cover for her. (R. 995). 
8. Jennings learned of the Accident when a lady told him that another 
lady had slipped and fallen. (R. 914 and 916). 
9. When Jennings could not contact Blank by phone, he called 
Duncan, because Jennings did not know how to handle the Accident. (R. 918 
and 920). 
10. Jennings called Duncan at his store on Highland Drive and told 
him that a lady had fallen on the comer and, in response, Duncan went to the 
Store. (R. 968 and 981). When Duncan arrived at the Store, K. Choate and B. 
Choate were no longer at the Store. (R. 920). 
11. Duncan estimated that 10-15 minutes elapsed between getting the 
call from Jennings at his store and arriving at the Store. (R. 971). 
12. Jennings testified that in the time after he started his shift at the 
Store at 2:53 p.m., he was 90% sure that he applied ice melt before the 
Accident. (R. 900, 932 and 935). When Duncan arrived, on his way into the 
7 
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Store, he saw adequate ice melt on the Walkway. (R. 985-987, 996 and 998). 
Duncan did not see any ice on the Walkway. (R. 997-998). After entering the 
Store, Duncan went back out to the Walkway and took photographs that would 
show the ice melt on the day of the Accident, if they could have been located. 
(R. 997). 
13. B. Choate testified that there was no ice melt on the Walkway 
when K. Choate fell. (R. 876). When B. Choate walked back into the store to 
prepare a second accident report, she was sure there was no ice melt on the 
Walkway. (R. 864-865). 
14. Jennings was cross-examined at trial concerning customers telling 
him that the walkway had a slippery spot as follows: 
1236390.1 
Q. Okay. And so you - and you kind of - you went 
to look at it and I suppose, because you didn't want to 
fall, you were pretty tentative and kind of reached, 
you know, sort of feeling it and looking at it at the 
same time? 
A. Right. Well, but I had walked over that spot all 
the time. 
Q. But - but you never, to your knowledge, you 
never walked across it when it was a black ice 
situation, had you? I mean, you didn't do that 
intentionally, did you? 
A. What -- what do you mean? 
Q. When -- when it was frozen over, like walking at a 
normal pace, when you know there was going to be 
black ice there, you -
8 
@ 
(R. 945). 
A. Yeah. Like I said, I've never - I never slipped or 
anything like that and I walk over that spot more than 
anybody. 
15. Jennings had been told by regular customers about a slippery 
condition at the northeast comer of the sidewalk, but it did not happen often and 
no one ever fell, except K. Choate. (R. 909-910). Water would come off the 
roof somewhere below the comer and freeze at night, but Jennings could not 
remember the approximate area on the Walkway. (R. 910). Water would drip 
off the roof every eight seconds only in the daytime. (R. 941 ). The water 
freezing on the Walkway was never a big enough issue for Jennings to be 
mention it to management. (R. 913). 
16. David Marshall ("Marshall") was employed by ARS-Fresno from 
the time it purchased the stores in 2008. (R. 1041 ). 
17. Marshall was aware that, on days with melting and thawing, water 
would drip through the seams in the metal awning and on cold days could form 
ice to the north and south of the Store's door. (R. 1047 and 1049). Marshall 
testified that the florescent lighting in the metal awning did not have enough 
heat to cause snow to melt. (R. 1065). 
18. At the time of trial, Jennings was employed by a grocery store, but 
between the termination of his employment atARS-Fresno in September 2013 
9 
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and the trial, Jennings had filed and resolved a wage dispute with the Utah 
Labor Commission against ARS-Fresno. (R. 894 and 896). 
19. Jennings testified that K. Choate and B. Choate came into the Store 
and asked him what he was going to do about the Accident and who was going 
to pay for it, as if he owned the Store. (R. 921 and 924 ). 
20. Jennings thought it was "weird" or "strange" that K. Choate and B. 
Choate were not customers and he had never seen anyone walk across the gas 
station at an angle and get up on the Walkway at the front of the Store, when 
there was a perfectly good sidewalk in the same direction they were going. (R. 
922-923). 
21. Jennings asked K. Choate and B. Choate if they wanted an 
ambulance and "[t]hey said no." (R. 925-926). 
22. Jennings thought it was "odd" that, after K. Choate and B. Choate 
had reported the Accident to him, they walked in the same direction where K. 
Choate had fallen (R. 930). 
23. B. Choate testified that Jennings said he had "been really busy and 
so didn't know if the person that had just left the shift had salted or not, he 
hadn't had time - I believe that he said he hadn't had time to check it." 
(R. 847). 
10 
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24. B. Choate recalled that Jennings talked on the phone, because he 
did not know where the accident reports were or what he should do, and she 
remembered hearing Jennings say that he did not know whether there was ice 
melt out on the Walkway or not, because he had not been at work very long and 
did not have time to check it. (R. 848-849 and 867-868). 
25. K. Choate was under the impression from her discussion with 
Jennings that he had just come on shift, was really busy with customers and had 
not had time to take care ice melt on the Walkway. (R. 1245). 
26. On the day of the Accident, Jennings worked at the Store from 
2:53 p.m. until 10:58 p.m. (R. 900, 961, and 1042-1043). On the day of the 
Accident, Marshall worked at the Store from 11 :11 a.m. until 3:44 p.m. (R. 
901, 961, and 1042-1043). Jennings and Marshall worked together 51 minutes. 
(R. 900-901 and 960-962). 
27. K. Choate testified that the Accident happened at 4:47 p.m. (R. 
1203). 
28. K. Choate was not wearing boots she owned, because they not 
have any grip in snow and were slick. K. Choate did not have any winter boots 
with treads for walking in snow. (R. 1190-1191 and 1249). 
29. B. Choate testified that at the time of the Accident she and K. 
Choate were "bundled up" and "it was so cold," but "there was a break in the 
1 1 
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weather" and she did not remember it snowing while she and K. Choate were 
walking, after parking at Smith's. (R. 835). 
30. B. Choate recalled that driving to Smith's the roads were wet and 
there was snow on the sides of the road. (R. 836). 
31. In front of one of the stores while walking to the Store, B. Choate 
encountered difficulty, near the Modem Display store, because the sidewalk 
was not shoveled and a pile of snow on the ground was frozen. (R. 836-83 7, 
1194 and 1243). 
32. B. Choate was walking northbound on the Walkway behind K. 
Choate and saw K. Choate step up on the Store walkway to avoid a car and very 
shortly afterwards K. Choate fell. (R. 839-840 and 1197). 
33. B. Choate testified that while she was walking behind K. Choate 
on the walkway it looked wet. (R. 840). K. Choate testified that the Walkway 
looked wet while she was walking on it, but she did not know whether the 
temperature was below 32 degrees and it did not occur to her that the wet 
Walkway may be icy. (R. 1198 and 1243). When B. Choate went up really 
close to K. Choate she could see that the Walkway was icy. (R. 842). K. 
Choate testified that she only saw the ice on the Walkway after she fell. (R. 
1202). 
12 
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34. B. Choate recalled that K. Choate was carrying grocery bags and a 
purse. (R. 843, 873 and 1192-1193). 
35. B. Choate was walking normally and she did not remember that 
she and K. Choate were "being extremely careful." (R. 873). 
36. B. Choate recalled that sometime after she entered the Store, K. 
Choate "somehow managed to get up and hobble into the store." (R. 847). B. 
Choate did not notice K. Choate come into the store so she did not know 
whether Jennings noticed K. Choate come in. (R. 874). K. Choate testified that 
if Jennings saw her come into the Store he would have seen her hobbling or 
limping. (R. 1248). K. Choate emphasized to Jennings that she was in real 
pam. (R. 1249). 
37. Jennings though it was "weird" or "odd" that K. Choate did not 
seem to be injured. (R. 928). 
3 8. Tim Wyatt ("Wyatt"), an owner of an architectural-design firm, 
testified that he had obtained weather records from the Salt Lake City Airport 
(the "Records") which showed that there was 2.50 inches of snow on 
December 26, 2012; 2.80 inches on December 27; and .90 inches on 
December 28. (R. 1155 and 1168-1169). 
13 
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39. The Records reported that on December 26 the minimum 
temperature was 22 degrees and the maximum was 32 degrees. (R. 1167 and 
1176). 
40. The Records stated that on December 27 the minimum temperature 
was 25 degrees and the maximum was 29 degrees. (R. 1168). 
41. The Records showed that on December 28 the minimum 
temperature was 17 degrees and the maximum was 33 degrees. (R. 1168-1169). @ 
42. The Records showed that the hourly temperatures on the afternoon 
of December 28 were as follows: 12:53 32 p.m. degrees, 1 :53 p.m. 32 degrees, 
3 :53 p.m. 26 degrees. (R. 1155-1156). 
43. The Records for December 28, 2012, stated that sunset was at 5:08 
p.m. and twilight was at 5 :39 p.m., which meant that the Accident happened at 
dusk or sunset. (R. 1169). 
44. The Records reported that there were no sunny or clear days 
between December 26 and 28, 2012. (R. 1169-1170). 
45. Wyatt testified that the eight to ten-inch surface of the top of the 
parapet wall on the roof at the front of the Store was one percent of the total 
surface of the roof. (R. 1172-1173 ). Thus, water dripping off the parapet cap of 
the roof would be less than one percent of the snow or rain falling on the roof. 
(R. 1173). 
14 
1236390.1 
46. Merlin Taylor ("Taylor"), a construction contractor that has built or 
remodeled over a thousand projects since 1980, was hired by ARS Fresno to 
inspect the Store's roof on November 14, 2014. (R. 1265 and 1267). 
47. The top, outer edge of the front of the Store's roof was a parapet 
wall and the top of the wall had a metal cap. (R. 1274-1275). 
48. The parapet cap should have a three to five percent grade back 
toward the inside of the roof to drain the water into the interior portion of the 
roof. (R. 1275). 
49. The designed drainage path would be to send water that landed on 
top of the parapet cap to the interior roof drain. (R. 1279). 
50. In Taylor's inspection, the parapet cap revealed it was flat or 
tipping forward and as part of maintenance the cap should be re-installed. (R. 
1275 and 1281). 
51. The relaxed parapet cap allowed water to accumulate away from 
the designed drainage path. (R. 1279). Water or snow on the parapet cap would 
stay on top if the temperature was below 32 degrees. (R. 1282). 
52. Taylor's opinion was that the lighting system would not produce 
enough heat to reach the top of the parapet cap. (R. 1281). 
15 
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53. Taylor's opinion was that the relaxed parapet cap was not a breach 
of the duty of reasonable care, because it was not serious and it was a 
maintenance issue. (R. 1283 ). 
54. Taylor's opinion was that there was not a leak in the roof. 
(R. 1285-1286). 
55. Taylor disagreed with Wyatt's opinion that there was a roof leak. 
(R. 1286-1287). 
56. In Instruction No. 8, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
"You are the excusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 
of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the 
witnesses, you have the right to take into consideration any biases, any interest 
in the result, and any motive to testify fairly." (R. 568). 
57. On November 4, 2015, the trial court entered its Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for New trial and Granting, in Part, and Denying, in Part, 
Defendant's Verified Memorandum of Costs (the "New Trial Order"). (R. 796-
801; Appellant's Addendum). 
58. In the New Trial Order, the trial court denied K. Choate's motion 
for a new trial, because the jury verdict finding K. Choate 60% negligent was 
supported by sufficient evidence, the trial court deferred to the jury's credibility 
findings in reaching its verdict that K. Choate was 60% negligent, and the trial 
16 
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court provided a detailed description of the conflicting evidence concerning the 
parties' comparative negligence. (R. 796-801; Appellant's Addendum). 
SUMMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Although the evidence offered at trial by K. Choate and ARS-Fresno 
conflicted on important issues, it does not entitle K. Choate to overturn the 
verdict, since only some evidence and reasonable inferences were required to 
support the verdict. Indeed, determining the credibility of witnesses is the 
prime function of the jury. The verdict finding K. Choate 60% at fault for the 
Accident means that the jury found her evidence less credible than ARS-
Fresno' s evidence and this Court should refrain from disturbing the verdict. 
The verdict finding K. Choate 20% more at fault than ARS-Fresno was 
supported by evidence and reasonable inferences showing that K. Choate 
should have been more careful after three days of snow, below-freezing 
temperatures, and no sunshine. K. Choate failed to dispute the evidence 
concerning additional precautions she should have, or could have, taken when 
she saw that the Walkway was wet in below-freezing temperatures. 
This Court should assume that the jury believed those aspects of the facts 
and reasonable inferences which supported the verdict and, if it does, the 
verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence. In fact, the verdict was 
overwhelmingly supported by the evidence that K. Choate was significantly 
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more at fault for the Accident than ARS-Fresno, especially testimony by 
Duncan, Jennings, Marshall, and Taylor that adequate ice melt was on the 
Walkway before the Accident and water only dripped from the roof in melting 
or thawing conditions. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL, BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND THAT 
ARS-FRESNO'S TESTIMONY WAS MORE CREDIBLE 
THAN K. CHOATE'S TESTIMONY 
There were numerous, material conflicts in the testimony offered by K. 
Choate's witnesses compared to ARS-Fresno's witnesses. "[T]he existence of 
conflicting evidence, alone, does not justify overturning a verdict for 
insufficient evidence." Avalos v. TL Custom, LLC, 2014 UT App 150, ,I 29 
( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, this Court should not 
disturb the verdict as long as "some evidence and reasonable inferences" 
support it. Id. In receiving Instruction No. 8, the jurors were properly 
instructed by the trial court that they were "the excusive judges of the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence." Neither party 
objected to Instruction No. 8. Moreover, Instruction No. 8 accurately states the 
applicable standard under Utah law for denying motions for new trial where 
jury verdicts depend on determinations of the credibility of witnesses. Id. (it is 
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the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses). 
In Bridzette Lane v. D. C., 104 F. Supp. 3d 7 (D.D.C. 2015), after a 
wrongful death verdict was entered in favor of the defendants, the court denied 
the plaintiffs motion for new trial. The court noted that, unlike the narrow 
review by an appellate court of the denial of a motion for new trial, "[i]n 
granting a motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict was against the 
weight of the evidence, the trial judge risks usurping the prime function of the 
jury-to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses." Id. 
at 9 (citation omitted); see also Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 363 
(2d Cir. 1992) (where the resolution of the issues depends on an assessment of 
the credibility of witnesses it is proper for the court to refrain from granting a 
new trial). 
At trial, critical testimony by K. Choate and B. Choate concerning the 
cause of the Accident conflicted with the testimony of multiple other witnesses. 
The jurors could not have found K. Choate 60% at fault if they believed her 
testimony, as corroborated by B. Choate, in the many instances it contradicted 
the testimony of other witnesses. 
K. Choate and B. Choate claimed that the Accident happened, because 
there was no ice melt on the Walkway where she walked or where she fell. By 
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contrast, Jennings testified that he was 90% sure that he applied ice melt before 
the Accident and Duncan testified that there was ice melt on the Walkway, 
which he photographed, when he arrived after the Accident. Jennings testified 
that he was busy with customers in the Store and did not apply ice melt between 
the time the Accident was reported to him and when Duncan arrived 10-15 
minutes later. 
K. Choate and B. Choate testified that Jennings stated that he had just 
started working at the time of the Accident and had not had time to apply ice 
melt to the Walkway before the Accident. However, the time records admitted 
into evidence and the testimony of multiple witnesses were undisputed that 
Jennings had been working for 1 hour and 54 minutes before the Accident. In 
addition, the suggestion that Jennings did not have time to apply ice melt before @ 
the Accident, because he was too busy with customers working "single 
coverage," was contradicted by the time records and testimony proving that he 
worked "double coverage" with Marshall for 51 minutes before the Accident. 
In Instruction No. 8 the jury was instructed that, in judging the weight 
and credibility of the witnesses, the jury had the right to take into consideration 
the witnesses' biases and interest in the result. In weighing the contradictory 
testimony ofK. Choate and Jennings, the jury may have believed that K. 
Choate had a bias and interest in obtaining a favorable verdict, which Jennings 
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did not have. Specifically, when Jennings testified, not only was he no longer 
employed by ARS-Fresno, after his employment terminated he demonstrated 
his bias against ARS-Fresno by filing a wage claim at the Utah Labor 
Commission. Similarly, as a former employee, Jennings had no interest in the 
result, since his trial testimony would not affect his continued employment. 
K. Choate and B. Choate testified that K. Choate hobbled or limped in 
and out of the Store and her injuries should have been obvious to Jennings. In 
contrast, Jennings testified that K. Choate did not appear injured and when she 
left he saw her walk toward the area where the Accident happened. When 
asked by Jennings, K. Choate declined an ambulance, but she asked him 
whether he was going to pay her for the Accident as though he was the owner 
of ARS-Fresno. 
Finally, K. Choate contended that there was a roof leak which caused 
water to drip every 8 seconds on the Walkway in the area where the Accident 
happened and that, even if the temperature was below freezing, heat produced 
by lighting could have caused water to drip on the Walkway. However, 
Jennings and Marshall testified that water dripped off the roof only when 
melting and thawing occurred. Marshall testified that lighting did not produce 
enough heat to melt snow on the roof. ARS-Fresno's expert contractor, Taylor, 
testified that there was not a roof leak and that lighting did not cause an increase 
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in temperatures on the roof. Taylor explained that the parapet cap was relaxed 
which meant that, in above-freezing conditions, water could drip off the front 
edge of the parapet roof. The Records showed that it was dusk or sunset at the 
time of the Accident and it was below-freezing. The Records further 
demonstrated that there was no sunshine and it was not above freezing for three 
days before the Accident. Thus, K. Choate did not prove that, in the conditions 
which existed for before the Accident, water dripped off the roof down to the 
Walkway. 
The contradictory trial testimony presented by K. Choate's witnesses, 
compared to ARS-Fresno's witnesses, covered the issues that were essential for 
the jury to decide the parties' comparative fault. The jury could not have found 
K. Choate 60% negligent without finding that ARS-Fresno' s witnesses were 
more credible than her witnesses. See Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 
UT App 226, ,r 24, 311 P .3d 564 (in reviewing a jury verdict the appellate court 
views the evidence in the light most supportive of the verdict and assumes the 
jury believed those aspects of the evidence which sustain it). 
K. Choate does not have the comprehensive and persuasive kind of 
evidence sufficient to meet her heavy burden to overturn the trial court's ruling 
denying her motion for new trial. The verdict should not be reversed unless 
"the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and @ 
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unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." Sharp v. 
Williams, 915 P.2d at 497. 
The evidence that K. Choate was more at fault than ARS-Fresno for the 
Accident was not completely lacking, slight, or unconvincing. Specifically, 
there was extensive and corroborated testimony by Duncan, Jennings, Marshall, 
and Taylor, to show that ice melt was on the Walkway and that, because of the 
three days of freezing conditions before the Accident, there was not a roof leak 
and water did not drip down to the Walkway. This Court should refrain from 
disturbing the verdict, since ARS-Fresno admitted some evidence and 
reasonable inferences to support the verdict. 
Therefore, the verdict finding K. Choate 60% at fault was not plainly 
unreasonable and unjust. 
II. THE JURY FOUND THAT K. CHOATE WAS 60% 
COMPARATIVELY AT FAULT, SINCE SHE SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN MORE CAREFUL IN WINTER WEATHER 
CONDITIONS 
In the Special Verdict the jury answered Question No. 5 that K. Choate 
was the primary cause of the Accident. Indeed, the jury's verdict finding K. 
Choate 60% at fault meant the jury concluded that she was significantly more 
negligent than ARS-Fresno. See Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Co,p., 2013 UT 
App 226, ,r 24 (in reviewing a jury verdict the appellate court views the 
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evidence in the light most supp01tive of the verdict). In other words, the jury 
did not find that the parties' comparative fault was a close call. 
In her brief, K. Choate has cited several Utah decisions where the jury 
found that the opposing parties' were each 50% comparatively negligent. See 
Sharp v. Williams, 915 P.2d at 497-99; Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 
1982). The verdict in this action was markedly different, because the jury 
found a 20% difference in the relative negligence of the parties. On the other 
hand, K. Choate has cited other Utah decisions where the jury found that the 
defendants were 0% negligent. See Harris v. Utah Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217 
(Utah 1983 ); Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products, Inc., 93 9 P .2d 1213 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997); Holmes v. Nelson, 326 P.2d 722 (Utah 1958). Again, the verdict in 
this action was vastly different, because the jury found that ARS-Fresno was 
40% at fault. 
The 20% difference in the parties' comparative negligence means that K. 
Choate has a two-step burden to reverse the jury's verdict under Section 78B-5-
818. K. Choate would be barred from recovery of damages unless this Court 
holds that ARS-Fresno's fault was more than 50%. In other words, it is not 
enough to persuade this Court that the verdict finding K. Choate 60% at fault 
was erroneous, to recover damages K. Choate must prove that the jury's verdict 
was in error by more than 10 %. If this Court cannot conclude that the verdict 
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finding K. Choate 60% at fault was 10% too high, there would be no reason to 
reverse the trial court, since K. Choate' s recovery would be the same. 
Utah opinions where parties appealed wider differences in jury verdicts 
have more precedential value in considering this action. For example, in 
Bonnivier v. Valley Asphalt, 2000 UT App 117, the plaintiff appealed the trial 
court's denial of a motion for a new trial after the jury found that he was 90% at 
fault and defendant was 10% at fault for an auto-motorcycle accident. At trial 
several witnesses testified that they did not see plaintiff on his motorcycle at an 
intersection, because he was too close behind defendant's vehicle. Plaintiff 
testified that he was close to the vehicle, because it was driving at a slower rate 
of speed and he was preparing to pass it. The trial court's ruling was affirmed 
with minimal discussion, since this testimony was sufficient to support the 
verdict. 
K. Choate relies on Wilhelm v. City of Great Falls, 685 P.2d 350 (Mont. 
1984 ), a decision where the jury found the homeowners 90% comparatively 
negligent in their nuisance action for smoke, stench and litter from defendants' 
city dump. However, the Montana Supreme Court was reviewing the trial 
court's order granting a new trial. An appeal of a ruling granting a new trial is 
substantially different from the appeal of a denial of a new trial. In pa1ticular, a 
trial judge has maximum latitude in exercising discretion to grant a motion for 
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new trial, since the trial judge has heard and seen the evidence and is best suited 
to evaluate the claim that it was insufficient to justify the verdict. Nelson v. 
Trujillo, 657 P .2d at 731-32 (there is a different standard of appellate review of 
trial court decisions on motions for new trial, depending on whether the court 
denied or granted the motion). This may explain the reason that the Montana 
Supreme Court's only explanation for affirming the trial court's order was that 
there was insufficient evidence that the homeowners were 90% comparatively 
negligent for the nuisance merely by building their home near the city dump. 
The evidence that K. Choate was 60% at fault for the Accident was not 
effectively disputed by K. Choate during trial. K. Choate did not dispute that 
the temperatures for three days before the Accident were below freezing and 
that there was no sunshine. K. Choate did not dispute that the afternoon of the 
Accident it was never above freezing and that it was dusk or sunset at the time 
of the Accident. K. Choate admitted that she knew she would be walking a 
number of blocks before the Accident. K. Choate testified that while driving 
and walking before the Accident she saw snow and ice on the roads and 
sidewalks and, while walking on the sidewalk near the Store, she saw a pile of 
snow frozen on the ground. Nevertheless, K. Choate conceded that she was not 
wearing winter shoes and she was carrying a purse and grocery bags. K. 
Choate, as corroborated by B. Choate, testified that she saw that the Walkway 
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was wet before the Accident, but B. Choate did not remember them being 
extremely careful in the way they walked. 
Therefore, at trial K. Choate did not effectively dispute that her 
comparative negligence was equal to, or greater than, ARS-Fresno' s 
negligence. 
III. THE JURY VERDICT FINDING THAT K. CHOATE WAS 
60%> NEGLIGENT AND ARS-FRESNO WAS 40% 
NEGLIGENT WAS OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE 
ARS-Fresno's primary liability defenses were that there was sufficient 
ice melt on the Walkway and that K. Choate should have been more careful in 
walking in winter weather conditions. Whether there was adequate ice melt and 
how careful K. Choate should have been before the Accident are fact-intensive 
questions that were decided by the jury and should not be overturned by an 
appellate court. 
To overturn a jury verdict "places a difficult burden on the challenging 
pa1ty." Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d at 1257. To reverse a jury 
verdict the appellant must show that it is against the clear weight of the 
evidence by marshaling all of the evidence supporting the verdict and 
demonstrating that when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict there is 
insufficient evidence to support it. Selvage v. J.J Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 
1252, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). This Court will "assume that the jury 
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believed those aspects of the evidence which sustain its findings and judgment." 
Stevensen 3rd East, LC v. Watts, 2009 UT App 137, ,I 26,210 P.3d 977 
( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
K. Choate attempted to meet her burden to marshal the evidence by 
reciting a list of facts. Most of these facts are arguments, or were used by K. 
Choate at trial to argue, that ARS-Fresno was negligent, but these arguments 
were rejected by the jury. More importantly, K. Choate failed to consider the 
numerous other facts and reasonable inferences that supported the verdict. If 
this Court assumes the jury believed the following additional facts and 
inferences supporting the verdict, the weight of the evidence was not clearly 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict: 
1236390.1 
( 1) Jennings was 90% sure that he had placed ice 
melt prior to the Accident and when Duncan came to the 
Store to assist Jennings, Duncan saw and photographed ice 
melt, Jennings did not place any ice melt after the Accident 
was reported to him and before Duncan arrived. 
(2) K. Choate and B. Choate observed that the 
Walkway looked wet before the Accident, but despite 
knowledge that it may be below freezing B. Choate did not 
remember them being extremely careful in the way they 
walked. 
(3) K. Choate and B. Choate took a shortcut through 
the Store property that Jennings testified was weird or 
strange, because he had never seen pedestrians that were not 
customers walk across the property at an angle to walk on 
the Walkway. 
( 4) There were three days of snow and below 
freezing temperatures before the Accident, the Accident 
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happened at dusk or sunset, K. Choate saw snow and ice on 
roads and sidewalks before the Accident. 
(5) K. Choate was not wearing winter shoes, but she 
knew she would be walking a number of blocks prior to the 
Accident. 
(6) K. Choate was carrying a purse and grocery bags 
at the time of the Accident. 
(7) The Walkway did not consistently have ice on it 
from water dripping from the roof, since it depended on the 
weather conditions. 
(8) There was disputed evidence concerning where 
the Accident happened on the Walkway in comparison to 
where water had been reported to drip from the roof. 
(9) K. Choate and B. Choate testified that Jennings 
said that he had just started working before the Accident and 
he did not have time to apply ice melt, but the evidence was 
undisputed that he had been working for 1 hour and 54 
minutes before the Accident and Jennings and Marshall had 
worked together for 51 minutes before the Accident. 
(10) Taylor's expert opinions were that the relaxed 
parapet cap was not a breach of the duty of reasonable care 
and that there was not a roof leak. 
If this Court assumes that the jury believed those aspects of these 
additional facts and inferences which sustained its verdict, the verdict was not 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Indeed, the clear weight of the 
evidence was that K. Choate was 60% or more negligent. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, ARS-Fresno requests that the Court affirm 
the jury's verdict finding that K. Choate was 60% negligent. 
DATED this 12th day of July, 2016. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
B\_ ag~s ~ds?: ------
Attorneys for Appellee ARS-Fresno, LLC 
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